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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the sharing economy has been rapid and transformative.  It has 
changed the way many Americans commute, shop, vacation, and borrow.  It has 
also disrupted long-established industries, from taxis to hotels, and has 
confounded policymakers unsure of how or even whether to regulate these new 
markets.  In this Paper, we discuss the central benefit of the sharing economy 
thus far: it has overcome market imperfections without recourse to regulatory 
bodies prone to capture by entrenched firms. 
As an introduction to the various issues surrounding this ongoing debate, 
we begin with an explanation of the sharing economy.1  Then we review the 
traditional “consumer protection” rationales for economic regulation and explain 
why many regulations persist even though their initial justifications are no 
longer valid.2  We argue continued application of these outmoded regulatory 
regimes is likely to harm consumers.3  In the last section, we explain how the 
Internet and information technology alleviate the need for much of this top-
down regulation and are likely to do a better job of serving consumers.4  We 
conclude with some proposals for further research in this area and call for a 
more informed regulatory approach that accounts for the innovations of the 
sharing economy.5  When market circumstances change dramatically—or when 
new technology or competition alleviate the need for regulation—then public 
policy should evolve and adapt to accommodate these new realities. 
II. RISE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
While still in its infancy, the sharing economy has grown substantially in 
recent years.  Young firms like Uber and Airbnb claim thousands of customers, 
operate in hundreds of cities worldwide, and are valued at tens of billions of 
                                                
1 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 6–13. 
2 See infra Part III and accompanying notes 14–49. 
3 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 50–71. 
4 See infra Part V and accompanying note 72. 
5 See infra Part VI and accompanying notes 73–74. 
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dollars.6  Despite its rapid growth and enormous popularity with consumers, 
there is no universally accepted definition of the “sharing economy,” which is 
also known as the “collaborative economy,” the “peer-production economy,” or 
the “peer-to-peer economy.”7  We suggest it is helpful to think of the sharing 
economy as any marketplace that brings together distributed networks of 
individuals to share or exchange otherwise underutilized assets.8  It encompasses 
all manner of goods and services shared or exchanged for both monetary and 
nonmonetary benefit. 
The sharing economy creates value in at least five ways: 
• By giving people an opportunity to use others’ cars, kitchens, 
apartments, and other property, it allows underutilized assets or 
“dead capital” to be put to more productive use.9 
• By bringing together multiple buyers and sellers, it makes both the 
supply and demand sides of its markets more competitive and allows 
greater specialization. 
• By lowering the cost of finding willing traders, haggling over 
terms, and monitoring performance, it cuts transaction costs and 
expands the scope of trade.10 
• By aggregating the reviews of past consumers and producers and 
                                                
6 Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion-Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 18, 2015, http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club. 
7 See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (HarperCollins Publishers 2010); DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. 
WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (Portfolio 2008); 
JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF 
BUSINESS (Crown Business 2008); GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND 
TECHNOLOGY EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER 
GOLIATHS (Thomas Nelson 2006); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (Yale Univ. Press 2006). 
8 See, e.g., Rachel Boston, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-
definition.  It may be helpful to think of a sharing economy as a special case of a “two-sided” or 
“platform” market.  It is special because it typically employs technology to bring together large 
numbers of buyers and large numbers of sellers.  For more on platform markets, see Alex Tabarrok, 
Jean Tirole and Platform Markets, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Oct. 13, 2014), http://marginal 
revolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/10/tirole-and-platform-markets.html.  See also Stewart 
Dompe & Adam Smith, Regulation of Platform Markets in Transportation, MERCATUS CENTER AT 
GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Oct. 27 2014), http://mercatus.org/publication/regulation-platform-markets-
transportation. 
9 Daniel M. Rothschild, How Uber and Airbnb Resurrect ‘Dead Capital’, UMLAUT (Apr. 9, 
2014), http://theumlaut.com/2014/04/09/how-uber-and-airbnb-resurrect-dead-capital.  On the 
broader concept of “dead capital,” see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY 
CAPITALISM SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE, (1st ed., Basic Books 2000).  
10 Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979). 
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putting them at the fingertips of new market participants, it can 
significantly diminish the problem of asymmetric information 
between producers and consumers.11 
• By offering an “end-run” around regulators who are captured by 
existing producers, it allows suppliers to create value for customers 
long underserved by those incumbents that have become inefficient 
and unresponsive because of their regulatory protections. 
These factors can improve consumer welfare by offering new innovations, 
more choices, more service differentiation, better prices, and higher-quality 
services.  Despite this, the sharing economy and its regulation have become 
highly charged policy topics, especially at the local level.12  Fueling this debate, 
many municipal governments are attempting to impose older regulatory regimes 
on these new services without much thought about whether they are still 
necessary to protect consumer welfare.13  However, by expanding the range of 
options and information available to consumers, the sharing economy removes 
the need for regulation in many cases.  In fact, continued application of 
outmoded regulatory regimes may actually harm consumers. 
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION: FROM MARKET FAILURE TO GOVERNMENT 
FAILURE 
Protecting consumer welfare has long been one of the principal rationales 
for economic regulation.  Under the traditional “public interest theory” of 
regulation, regulation is sought to protect consumers from externalities, 
inadequate competition, price gouging, asymmetric information, unequal 
bargaining power, and a host of other perceived “market failures.”14 
                                                
11 George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84.3 Q. J. ECON 488–500 (1970). 
12 Katheleen Conti, Municipalities Seek to Regulate Peer-to-Peer Services, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Aug. 31, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/south/2014/08/30/quincy-fines-couple-
for-running-illegal-enters-debate-over-regulation-service-sharing-
economy/K43HOxC5N6zXy5dwVk4CTM/story.html; Shane Tews, The Sharing Economy under 
Pressure: Uber, Lyft and Airbnb’s Regulatory Roadblocks Continue, TECH POL’Y DAILY (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://www.techpolicydaily.com/technology/sharing-economy-pressure. 
13 Eli Lehrer & Andrew Moylan, Embracing the Peer-Production Economy, NAT’L AFFAIRS 51, 
56 (2014), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/embracing-the-peer-production-
economy (“Across the country, laws that were written long before the emergence of the peer-
production economy to address issues quite different from those under consideration today are now 
being invoked as barriers to peer-production services.  These antiquated regulatory structures have 
led to something of a ‘ban first, ask questions later’ mentality in many cities.”).  
14 See 1 Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (MIT Press 
1971); David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Government and Business: The Economics of 
Antitrust and Regulation 9–15 (Dryden Press 1995). 
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Unfortunately, as economists Mark Steckbeck and Peter J. Boettke 
observe, regulators often ignore “the dynamism of markets and the incentive 
mechanism driving entrepreneurs to discover ways to ameliorate problems 
associated with market exchange.”15  Markets are not static, and every 
information problem is also an information opportunity.  “Market processes 
emerge from a series of trial and error experimentations, derived from a 
progression of finding a more efficient means of facilitating exchange,” note 
Steckbeck and Boettke.16  “The role of the entrepreneur is, by continually 
updating information, to discover more efficient means of promoting human 
interaction, thus facilitating exchange.”17 
Moreover, the historical analysis of regulation demonstrates, in practice, 
regulation does not always live up to the normative goals of those who seek it in 
the “public interest.”  The mere fact academics or policymakers claim that well-
intentioned regulation will protect consumers does not mean it actually will do 
so.18  This danger was well understood by one of the original exponents of the 
public interest theory of regulation.  Writing in 1920, Arthur C. Pigou cautioned 
against contrasting “the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise 
with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine.”19  
Instead, he noted, in the real world, policymakers might not implement policy as 
scholars think they ought to: “[F]or we cannot expect that any public authority 
                                                
15 Mark Steckbeck & Peter J. Boettke, Turning Lemons into Lemonade: Entrepreneurial 
Solutions in Adverse Selection Problems in E-Commerce, in Markets, Information and 
Communication: Austrian Perspectives on the Internet Economy 221, 221 (Jack Bimer ed., 
Routledge 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1538369.  
Steckbeck and Boettke’s comments echo sentiments first raised by Ludwig von Mises and Israel 
Kirzner, who argue for a more dynamic view of the market process.  See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, 
Competition and Entrepreneurship (Liberty Fund rev. ed. 2010) (1963); Israel M. Kirzner, Market 
Theory and the Price System (Liberty Fund rev. ed. 2011) (1963); Ludgwig Von Mises, Human 
Action: A Treatise on Economics, (Liberty Fund rev. ed. 2010) (1949).  Their works have 
demonstrated that market forces, instead of government regulations, can adjust behaviors and 
practices to correct imperfections, reduce frictions, and solve the problems of coordination that many 
others tend to identify as “failures.”  See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship 
(Liberty Fund rev. ed. 2010) (1963); Israel M. Kirzner, Market Theory and the Price System (Liberty 
Fund rev. ed. 2011) (1963); Ludgwig Von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, (Liberty 
Fund rev. ed. 2010) (1949). 
16 Steckbeck & Boettke, supra note 15, at 222. 
17 Id. at 227. 
18 As Milton Friedman once noted, “[o]ne of the great mistakes is to judge policies and 
programs by their intentions rather than their results.”  The Open Mind: Living Within Our Means 
(PBS television broadcast Dec. 7, 1975).  In addition, a reliance on good intentions has precipitated 
the move away from regulating perceived market failures to regulating perceived individual failures.  
This is particularly true in the rise of behavioral-based regulations.  See Christopher Koopman & 
Nita Ghei, Behavioral Economics, Consumer Choice, and Regulatory Agencies, Mercatus Center at 
George Mason Univ. (Aug. 27, 2013), http://mercatus.org/publication/behavioral-economics-
consumer-choice-and-regulatory-agencies. 
19 A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 332 (Macmillan reprint ed. 1920). 
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will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal.  Such authorities are 
liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal corruption by 
private interest.  A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organised for votes, 
may easily outweigh the whole.”20 
Indeed, public choice scholars have found Pigou’s warning to be 
prescient.21  Some of the deficiencies and unintended consequences of economic 
regulation are discussed below. 
A. Regulatory Capture and Rent-Seeking 
While many regulations are initially justified with the hope they will serve 
the public interest, the reality is many persist even when they no longer (or 
perhaps never did) correct any identifiable market failure.  As generations of 
economists, historians, and other scholars have noted, powerful and politically 
well-connected incumbents have an incentive to “capture” the regulatory system 
that is supposed to constrain them.22  This is because, by limiting entry or by 
raising rivals’ costs, regulations can be useful to the regulated firms.23  Though 
regulations often make consumers worse off, they are often sustained by 
political pressure from consumer advocates because they can be disguised as 
“consumer protection.”24  Scholars have identified a number of reasons why we 
might come to expect regulatory capture. 
For one, if a firm succeeds in capturing its regulator, it and perhaps a 
handful of other incumbents will reap the benefits of enhanced profits, while a 
large and diffuse group of consumers will bear the costs.  As the political 
economist Mancur Olson and others have shown, small, concentrated interests 
often find it easier to organize for their collective benefit than do large and 
                                                
20 Id. at 332. 
21 For a primer on public choice, see Matthew Mitchell & Peter Boettke, Bridging the Gap: The 
Mercatus Center at George Mason University and the Application of Academic Ideas to Real World 
Problems, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIV. (forthcoming).  For a primer on 
regulation, see SUSAN DUDLEY & JERRY BRITO, REGULATION: A PRIMER 12–15 (2nd ed. 2012). 
22 Adam Thierer, Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found, TECH. LIBERATION 
FRONT (Dec. 19, 2010), http://techliberation.com/2010/12/19/regulatory-capture-what-the-experts-
have-found; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 2 J.L. & ECON. 211–40 
(1976); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971). 
23 Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267–
71 (1983). 
24 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 
REGULATION, May–June 1983, at 12–16; ADAM SMITH & BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS AND 
BAPTISTS: HOW ECONOMIC FORCES AND MORAL PERSUASION INTERACT TO SHAPE REGULATORY 
POLITICS (Cato Inst. 2014). 
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diffuse interests.25  Thus, producers, rather than consumers, are likely to prevail 
in the effort to influence regulators. 
In addition to their organizational advantage, firms also have an 
informational advantage; they know more about their products than others.  
Though this information asymmetry is one rationale for regulation, it also 
explains why regulatory capture occurs.  Because firms are in a better position 
than the government to know their true costs, regulators have some discretion 
over how much effort they put into discovering these costs.  This, in turn, gives 
firms an incentive to bribe or otherwise convince regulators not to discover or 
reveal these costs.26  Firms can entice regulators with cash bribes, lobbying, or 
campaign donations.  But, those are not the only ways to buy influence.  
Information itself can be a currency.  Especially in highly technical fields, 
regulators often come to rely on firms for their knowledge and expertise.  
Indeed, it may be rational for them to do so.27  It is only natural, then, that 
regulators may come to see the world as the regulated firms see it.28 
Capture is also enhanced by the phenomenon of the revolving door: the 
tendency for personnel to move back and forth between regulatory agencies and 
the firms they oversee.  The revolving door spins because personal connections 
to government officials offer firms access to what those officials are thinking 
and may allow them to influence that thinking.29  It also spins because regulators 
and those responsible for firms’ regulatory compliance must develop highly 
                                                
25 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1965). 
26 Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 203, 203–
25 (2006); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT 
AND REGULATION (MIT Press 1993).  
27 Randall L. Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political 
Advice, 47 J. POL. 530, 530–55 (1985). 
28 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 36 
(MIT Press 1971): 
When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is 
under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the 
companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those 
monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the 
unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. 
 Id. at 46.  “Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory 
commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of 
the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.”  Id. at 12. 
29 Daron Acemoghu et al., The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the 
United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19701, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19701; Benjamin M. Blau, Tyler J. Brough & Diana W. Thomas, 
Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks, 37 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 
3007, 3007–17 (2013); Jordi Blanes I Vidal et al., Revolving Door Lobbyists, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 
3731, 3731–48 (2012). 
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specialized skillsets that are significantly less valuable anywhere else, a 
phenomenon known as “natural capture due to specialization.”30 
Lastly, regulators are prone to capture because the firms they oversee are 
often in a position to harm the reputation of the regulator or to make its life more 
difficult by, as the literature terms it, “squawking.”31  As a result, in an effort to 
avoid criticism or public complaints, regulators act not in the public interest but 
with the goal of keeping these interest groups quiet.  This can help explain the 
DC Taxicab Commissioner’s statement that it “does not fight with the people it 
regulates,”32 but instead acts as referee between competing interest groups.33 
Regulatory capture is not simply inequitable or unjust; it is also socially 
costly.  The possibility of capture encourages firms to expend vast amounts of 
resources—time, money, and effort—to influence regulators and their political 
overseers.34  This is what economists refer to as “rent-seeking.”  Because rent-
seeking is used to contrive exclusive privileges, rather than to create value for 
customers, these efforts cost society forgone productive opportunities.35  To 
compound the problem, rent-seeking changes the way people allocate their 
talents.  Rather than keeping a focus on devising new and innovative ways to 
create value, entrepreneurs turn their efforts toward devising new ways to 
acquire these regulatory privileges.  This not only wastes resources in a static 
sense, it also reduces the rate of economic growth over time by misdirecting 
entrepreneurial energy.36 
                                                
30 LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN PROSPERITY, at xxvi (Basic Books 2014). 
31 See George W. Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 
47, 47–54 (1972); see also Clare Leaver, Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and 
Evidence from Regulatory Agencies, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 572, 572–607 (2009); Ernesto Dal Bó, 
Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, Plata o Plomo?: Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political 
Influence, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 41–53 (2006). 
32 Martin Di Caro, Regulations Prompt New Fight between D.C. Taxicab Commission and Uber, 
AM. UNIV. RADIO, (Aug. 21, 2013), http://wamu.org/news/13/08/21/new_regulations_prompt_new_ 
fight_between_dc_taxicab_commission_and_uber. 
33 Editorial Board, The D.C. Taxicab Commission’s Uber Problem, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-dc-taxicab-commissions-uber-problem/2013/08/26/a0 
538428-0b38-11e3-9941-6711ed662e71_story.html. 
34 See MATTHEW MITCHELL, THE PATHOLOGY OF PRIVILEGE: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM 21–25 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr. ed., 2012), available at 
http://mercatus.org/publication/pathology-privilege-economic-consequences-government-favoritism. 
35 Id.; see also Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tarriffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224, 224–32 (1967); Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 
AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–303 (1974); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 336–37 (3d. ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
36 William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 893, 893–921 (1990); Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The 
Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 Q. J. ECON. 503, 503–30 (1991); MANCUR 
OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL 
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B. Restrictions on Entry and Innovation  
Due to the capture problem discussed above, regulations often become 
formidable barriers to new innovation, entry, and entrepreneurship.  For 
example, at the beginning of the 20th century many local governments began 
regulating the taxicab industry in an attempt to protect consumers from potential 
harms caused by market failures in the form of “information asymmetries.”  As 
a result, entry into the taxicab market and taxicab fares, services, and quality 
were restricted in a substantial way in most cities around the country.37  In 2006, 
there were only 12,799 licensed taxicabs in New York City, compared with 
21,000 in 1931, when the city had about 1 million fewer inhabitants.38  While 
many of the initial justifications have since faded away, these regulations 
remain, with the practical effect of protecting established incumbents from 
increased competition in the form of Uber and Lyft.  This is also true of many of 
the regulatory efforts prohibiting or limiting Airbnb and other innovative firms 
within and outside the sharing economy.39 
Sometimes even seemingly innocuous regulations can have 
counterproductive effects.  Some cities—such as Washington, DC, and New 
York—require all taxicabs to be painted the same color, ostensibly to make 
them more identifiable for potential passengers.40  Unfortunately, however, this 
requirement makes it more difficult for competitors to differentiate by brand.  
This undermines the competitive rivalry within the industry and reduces the 
incentive for firms to distinguish themselves in the level of customer service 
they provide.  With riders unable to differentiate those firms that provide 
additional levels of care from those that do not—especially when hailing 
taxicabs from the street—incumbent firms need not compete with one another 
on the quality of services they provide. 
It is not just customer care that may decline—innovation may also suffer.  
In a competitive market characterized by open entry and exit, firms are 
constantly competing to earn increased profits in one of two ways.41  First, they 
                                                
RIGIDITIES 75–117 (Yale Univ. Press 1982). 
37 Matthew Mitchell & Michael Farren, If You Like Uber, You Would’ve Loved the Jitney, L.A. 
TIMES, July 12, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mitchell-jitneys-uber-ride-share-
20140713-story.html.   
38 SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB FACT BOOK (2006), available at 
http://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/taxifb.pdf. 
39 Mark P. Mills, Airbnb at the Tip of the Spear of the Regulatory State versus Innovators, 
FORBES (June 18, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markpmills/2014/06/18/airbnb-at-
the-tip-of-the-spear-of-the-regulatory-state-versus-innovators/. 
40 D.C. Taxis Getting New Color Scheme, NBC WASHINGTON (Oct. 12, 2013, 7:41 AM), 
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/DC-Taxis-Getting-New-Color-Scheme-227450421.html. 
41 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 17–18. 
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can find innovative ways to minimize their costs, passing on some of the savings 
to customers.  As firms operate more efficiently, others will seek to innovate and 
economize as well, and those that fail to do so will eventually be driven out of 
the industry.  Second, as mentioned above, firms can compete by differentiating 
their products from those of their competitors.  This “dynamic competition” 
encourages firms to discover new ways of doing business and new ways of 
creating value for their customers.42 
When regulations prohibit price competition, competition along the 
quality dimension often becomes more intense.  This, in turn, encourages firms 
to seek further regulations that prohibit quality competition.  As the regulator 
and regulatory expert Alfred Kahn once put it, this explains the “inexorable 
tendency for regulation in the competitive market to spread.”43  It tells why we 
have seen a proliferation of taxi regulations that govern not just the quantity of 
cabs and the prices that they may charge, but also the paint colors and exterior 
lighting schemes they use, the passenger notices they post, the car models they 
drive, the payment methods they employ, and much more.  As one driver told 
the Washington Post, “Everywhere on this car has been regulated.  Look at it!”44 
The net effect of regulations that limit entry and homogenize price and 
quality is to insulate incumbent firms from dynamic competition that would 
otherwise benefit consumers. 
C. Higher Prices and Fewer Choices 
As a result of the above factors, regulation often undermines competition, 
resulting in higher prices, fewer choices, lower quality service, or some 
                                                
42 Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An 
Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60, 62 (1997).  Dynamic competition stands in stark contrast to 
the “perfectly competitive” model of neoclassical economics.  Id. at 68.  In the perfectly competitive 
model, “price taking” firms produce identical, homogenous products, and there is little role for the 
entrepreneur.  Id. at 70.  According to Israel Kirzner, dynamic competition is a better description of 
real-world competition and its benefits.  Id. at 69–70. 
43 THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 272 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).  In the 
context of airline regulations, Kahn asserts: 
Control price, and the result will be artificial stimulus to entry.  Control entry as well, 
and the result will be an artificial stimulus to compete by offering larger commission 
to travel agents, advertising, scheduling, free meals, and bigger seats.  The response of 
the complete regulator, then, is to limit advertising, control scheduling and travel 
agents’ commissions, specify the size of the sandwiches and seats and the charge for 
inflight movies.  
Id. 
44 Emily Badger, Taxi Medallions Have Been the Best Investment in America for Years: Now 
Uber May Be Changing That, WASH. POST, June 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/20/taxi-medallions-have-been-the-best-investment-in-america-for-
years-now-uber-may-be-changing-that/. 
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combination thereof.45  In particular, if firms are insulated from competition 
from new entrants, they can obtain some measure of monopoly or pricing power.  
This diminishes consumer welfare while enhancing producer profit.  But, 
because consumer welfare is diminished more than producer profit is enhanced, 
it yields a social loss, which economists refer to as “deadweight loss.”46 
To compound the problem, firms that benefit from regulatory barriers to 
entry are unlikely to minimize production costs.  Free of the rigor of 
competition, these firms and their employees are allowed to “slack off.”  These 
higher-than-normal production costs are known as “x-inefficiencies” and are in 
addition to the deadweight losses and rent-seeking losses we have already 
discussed.47 
For similar reasons, protected firms do not have the same need to satisfy 
consumer desires; instead, their success depends more on their ability to please 
regulators.48  This tends to make firms less alert to the sorts of entrepreneurial 
product and service innovations that consumers desire.49  This explains why 
regulated taxis have tended to only adopt credit card readers when their 
regulators have mandated them, while Uber and Lyft have done so without 
needing to be told. 
IV. HOW THE INTERNET SOLVES INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
The growth of the Internet and information technology markets opens up 
the possibility that consumer welfare can better be served by innovation and 
competition than by regulation.  In this section, we note the Internet helps 
entrepreneurs accomplish several things that regulation has failed to achieve.  
Specifically, it allows innovators to offer an expanded range of goods and 
services, greatly expands the information available to consumers, and provides 
strong reputational incentives for firms to improve the level of service being 
provided. 
                                                
45 ROBERT CRANDALL & JERRY ELLIG, ECONOMIC DEREGULATION AND CUSTOMER CHOICE: 
LESSONS FOR THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr. ed., 1997), available at 
http://mercatus.org/publication/economic-deregulation-and-customer-choice-lessons-electric-
industry. 
46 Deadweight loss can also be thought of as the forgone opportunity for mutually beneficial 
exchange. 
47 Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency’, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 392–
415 (1966). 
48 MITCHELL, supra note 34, at 20. 
49 Kirzner, supra note 42, at 81. 
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A. Expanded Range of Goods and Services 
First, and most obviously, the Internet and information technology give 
the public access to a broader range of goods and services.50  The ease of entry 
and innovation in the online world mean new entrants can provide better options 
and address problems previously thought to be unsolvable in the absence of 
regulation.51  Polls have revealed consumers currently take advantage of sharing 
economy services primarily because they offer greater convenience, better 
prices, and higher quality.52 
This is also attested by comparisons of Yelp ratings in almost any major 
city where ride-sharing firms operate.53 
B. Expanded Information 
Second, the Internet and information technology offer consumers more 
information about products and services and empower consumers to come 
together and act on that information.54  Traditionally, many economists have 
worried about the existence of information asymmetries between producers and 
consumers and argued that “the difficulty of distinguishing good quality from 
bad is inherent in the business world.”55  The best that could be hoped for in the 
pre-Internet era was that consumer watchdogs, competition between firms, and 
brand “goodwill” would be enough to safeguard consumer welfare.56 
But, the Internet largely solves this problem by providing consumers with 
                                                
50 See Bret Swanson, The Exponential Internet, BUS. HORIZON Q., Spring 2014, at 40–47, 
available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/article/foundation/BHQ-Spring 
12-Issue3-SwansonTheExponentialInternet.pdf.  
51 ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1–7 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr. ed., 2014). 
52 Jeremiah Owyang, People are Sharing in the Collaborative Economy for Convenience and 
Price, WEB-STRATEGIST.COM (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/03/24/ 
people-are-sharing-in-the-collaborative-economy-for-convenience-and-price. 
53 See, e.g., Matthew Mitchell, An Uber Challenge to Tacky Taxis, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/28/an-uber-challenge-to-tacky-taxis/; see 
also Matthew Mitchell & Christopher Koopman, Ride-Sharing Shows How Slow Governments Can  
Be, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 6, 2014, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2014/ 
07/07/Ride-sharing-shows-how-slow-governments-can-be/stories/201407070009. 
54 “By making it easier for groups to self-assemble and for individuals to contribute to group 
effort without requiring formal management (and its attendant overhead), these tools have radically 
altered the old limits on the size, sophistication, and scope of unsupervised effort.”  CLAY SHIRKY, 
HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 21 (Penguin 
Press 2008). 
55 Akerlof, supra note 11, at 500. 
56 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
223–24 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1980). 
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robust search and monitoring tools to find more and better choices.  These tools 
lower both search costs and transaction costs associated with commercial 
interactions.57  Moreover, unlike regulatory solutions, these market-developed 
tools cannot be captured.  Online e-commerce and the sharing economy 
developed thanks to these new realities. 
C. Consumer Empowerment via Reputational Feedback Mechanisms 
Third, information technology has facilitated the creation of countless 
reputational feedback mechanisms across the online ecosystem—such as 
product rating and review systems—that give consumers a more powerful voice 
in economic transactions.58  Before the Internet, “reputations travel[ed] 
haphazardly [through] word of mouth, . . . rumor[], or . . . the mass media,” but 
first-generation e-commerce sites like eBay and Amazon helped blaze the way 
for far more robust reputational feedback systems.59  Moreover, countless 
“expert” product review sites have been developed for almost every good and 
service available to consumers.60  Today, almost all sharing economy firms 
depend on these reputational feedback mechanisms to establish trust between 
suppliers and consumers.61  David D. Friedman notes “reputational enforcement 
works by spreading true information about bad behavior.  People who receive 
that information modify their actions accordingly, which imposes costs on those 
who have behaved badly.”62 
Sharing economy entrepreneurs have developed a number of other 
                                                
57 Clay Shirky speaks of a “ladder of activities . . . that are enabled by social tools” and that 
create greater opportunities for sharing, cooperation, collaboration, and collective action.  SHIRKY, 
supra note 54, at 47–54.  This enables what he refers to as “ridiculously easy group-forming,” which 
“matters because the desire to be part of a group that shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a basic 
human instinct that has always been constrained by transaction costs.”  Id. 
58 See, e.g., RANDY FARMER & BRYCE GLASS, BUILDING WEB REPUTATION SYSTEMS (O’Reilly 
Media 2010). 
59 Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMM. OF THE ACM 45, 45–48 (2000), available 
at http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2000/12/7494-reputation-systems/abstract. 
60 See Liangjun You & Riyaz Sikora, Performance of Online Reputation Mechanisms under the 
Influence of Different Types of Biases, 12 INFO. SYS. & E. BUS. MGMT. 418 (2014) (“Online opinion 
and consumer-review sites have dramatically changed the way consumers shop, enhancing or even 
supplanting traditional sources of consumer information such as advertising.”). 
61 See Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Designing Reputation Systems for the Social Web, in THE 
REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 3, 3 (Hassan 
Masum & Mark Tovey eds., MIT Press 2011) (“Reputation systems are arguably the unsung heroes 
of the social web.  In some form or another, they are an integral part of most of today’s social web 
applications.”). 
62 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, Contracts in Cyberspace, in FUTURE IMPERFECT: TECHNOLOGY AND 
FREEDOM IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 97, 100 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); see also Daniel Klein, 
Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, by Voluntary Means, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE 
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 1, 1–14 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1997). 
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monitoring mechanisms to ensure quality.  Uber and Lyft, for example, allow 
consumers to see the GPS path of their rides so they can independently verify 
the driver took the shortest route.  The firms also have the address and credit 
card information of every customer, which helps to ensure the drivers’ safety.  
This also permits all transactions to be cashless, reducing the incentive for theft.  
The result is more fully informed and empowered consumers.63  As economist 
Tyler Cowen observes, “[t]here has been a fundamental shift in the balance of 
power between consumers and salesmen over the last generation[,] and it points 
in the direction of consumers.”64 
D. Self-Regulating and Other-Regulating Markets 
The combination of these factors results in a powerful check on market 
power or abusive behavior.  The reputational incentives at work require firms to 
constantly seek ways to satisfy rapidly evolving consumer demands and to gain 
(and keep) consumers’ trust.65  As Adam Smith noted more than 250 years ago 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, “We desire both to be respectable and to be 
respected,” and people’s success in life “almost always depends upon the favour 
and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without a tolerably regular 
conduct these can very seldom be obtained.  The good old proverb, therefore, 
that honesty is the best policy, holds, in such situations, almost always perfectly 
true.”66 
Modern online feedback mechanisms have made it easier for honesty to be 
enforced through strong reputational incentives.67  And, because sharing 
                                                
63 See Randolph J. May & Michael J. Horney, The Sharing Economy: A Positive Shared Vision 
for the Future, 9 PERSPECTIVES FROM FSF SCHOLARS 1, 8 (Free State Foundation 2014), available 
at https://www.heartland.org/sites/default/files/the_sharing_economy_-_a_positive_shared_vision_ 
for_the_future_072914.pdf (“[O]nline applications offer a new, additional means of enabling trust, 
thereby facilitating trading and sharing in a way that creates new consumer choices and positively 
impacts the economy.”). 
64 TYLER COWEN, CREATE YOUR OWN ECONOMY: THE PATH TO PROSPERITY IN A DISORDERED 
WORLD 117 (Dutton 2009). 
65 See Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 100 Q. J. OF ECON. 1078, 1081 
(1985) (“A reputation for being ‘sound’ is a valuable asset, and we should expect people to make 
every effort to get it. . . . When the market is broad and there are many alternatives, you had better 
cooperate.  If you choose the noncooperative solution, you may find you have no one to 
noncooperate with.”). 
66 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 72, 74 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002). 
67 See Elodie Fourquet, Kate Larson & William Cowan, A Reputation Mechanism for Layered 
Communities, 6 ACM SIGECOM EXCH. 11, 11 (2006) (“Social science research has shown that 
feedback systems, or reputation mechanisms, increase trust and trustworthiness among strangers 
engaging in commercial transactions.  They provide summarized histories of past behaviour, 
increasing the opportunities of well-behaved participants, and decreasing those of poorly-behaved 
ones.  They thus improve trust by rewarding cooperation.”) (internal citation omitted). 
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platforms have opened traditionally cartelized industries to new competition, 
they have also permitted firms to regulate one another’s behavior.  Competitive 
firms are often quicker than regulators to point out the substandard service of 
their rivals.  The result is reasonably well-functioning, self-regulating markets 
with strong checks on improper behavior.  Bad actors get weeded out fairly 
quickly through better information, reputational incentives, and aggressive 
community self-policing.  Eric Goldman of Santa Clara School of Law refers to 
this as a “secondary invisible hand”: 
When information about producers and vendors is costly, reputational 
information can improve the operation of the invisible hand by helping 
consumers make better decisions. In this case, reputational information acts like 
an invisible hand of the invisible hand (an effect I call the secondary invisible 
hand) because reputational information can guide consumers to make 
marketplace choices that in aggregate enable the invisible hand. Thus, in an 
information economy with transaction costs, reputational information can play 
an essential role in rewarding good producers and punishing poor ones.68 
Thus, “to the extent that consumer protection regulation is based on the 
claim that consumers lack adequate information,” notes John C. Moorhouse, 
“the case for government intervention is weakened by the Internet’s powerful 
and unprecedented ability to provide timely and pointed consumer 
information.”69 Correspondingly, because the Internet and information 
technology alleviates the need for regulation in this fashion, and in light of the 
deficiencies associated with traditional regulatory mechanisms discussed above, 
consumer welfare may ultimately be better protected by loosening traditional 
regulations.70 
Economists generally agree that the presence of increased competition, 
innovation, and better information obviates the need for heavy-handed 
regulation. For example, in a recent poll, 93% of surveyed economists said they 
“agreed” or “strongly agreed” (and none disagreed) with the statement, “Letting 
car services such as Uber or Lyft compete with taxi firms on equal footing 
regarding genuine safety and insurance requirements, but without restrictions on 
prices or routes, raises consumer welfare.”71 
                                                
68 Eric Goldman, Regulating Reputation, in THE REPUTATION SOCIETY: HOW ONLINE OPINIONS 
ARE RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 53 (Hassan Masum & Mark Tovey eds., MIT Press 2011). 
69 John C. Moorhouse, Consumer Protection Regulation and Information on the Internet, in THE 
HALF-LIFE OF POLICY RATIONALES: HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY AFFECTS OLD POLICY ISSUES 139–40 
(Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein eds., Cato Inst. 2003). 
70 Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, 
WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-
government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy. 
71 Taxi Competition, IGM FORUM (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-
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V. THE PRO-CONSUMER, PRO-INNOVATION WAY TO “LEVEL THE PLAYING 
FIELD” 
Accidents will always happen, of course, and remedies to monitor and 
deal with bad behavior will always be necessary.  Importantly, private insurance, 
contracts, torts and product liability law, and other legal remedies exist when 
things go wrong.  Such ex post remedies do not discourage innovation and 
competition the way ex ante regulation does.  By trying to head off every 
hypothetical worst-case scenario, preemptive regulations actually discourage 
many best-case scenarios from ever coming about.72 
Incumbents who oppose new entry by sharing economy innovators will 
argue that they still face various regulatory burdens that new entrants are 
evading.  These include licensing requirements, price controls, service area 
requirements, marketing limitations, and technology standards.  In theory, this 
could place incumbents at a disadvantage relative to new sharing economy start-
ups that might not face the same regulations (even though those same 
regulations could simultaneously be used to keep smaller start-ups out of the 
market). 
Nevertheless, such regulatory asymmetries represent a legitimate policy 
problem.  But, the solution is not to punish new innovations by simply rolling 
old regulatory regimes onto new technologies and sectors.  The better alternative 
is to level the playing field by “deregulating down” to put everyone on equal 
footing, not by “regulating up” to achieve parity.  Policymakers should relax old 
rules on incumbents as new entrants and new technologies challenge the status 
quo.  By extension, new entrants should only face minimal regulatory 
requirements as more onerous and unnecessary restrictions on incumbents are 
relaxed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As we have explained, the fact regulations were justified on the grounds of 
consumer protection does not mean they accomplished those goals or that they 
are still needed today.73  Even well-intentioned policies must be judged against 
real-world evidence.74  Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many traditional 
                                                
economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7. 
72 THIERER, supra note 51, at viii. 
73 “Unfortunately, when it comes to public policy, good intentions are only slightly better than 
bad intentions, and not always even that.”  Joseph Epstein, ObamaCare and the Good Intentions 
Paving Co., WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/18UEwfx. 
74 “Intentions are not results.”  Don Boudreaux, Unintended Consequences, LEARN LIBERTY 
(June 29, 2011), http://www.learnliberty.org/videos/unintended-consequences. 
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consumer protection regulations hurt consumer welfare.  Markets, competition, 
reputational systems, and ongoing innovation often solve problems better than 
regulation when we give them a chance to do so. 
 While this Paper provides a brief introduction to the future of the sharing 
economy and a framework for understanding many of the issues surrounding its 
regulation, more research is needed in this area.  In particular, scholars could 
explore the ways in which the sharing economy has dealt with the problem of 
asymmetric information and evaluate how these solutions compare with 
traditional regulatory approaches.  What are the net benefits to society as a result 
of the growth in the sharing economy, and what are the overall consumer 
surpluses resulting from these new services and industries?  What are the 
benefits to those individuals that utilize these services—Uber, Lyft, Airbnb—as 
sources of income?  To what degree is the sharing economy creating new 
markets, rather than simply supplanting older forms of transactions?  As the 
sharing economy continues to grow, these and other questions should be 
addressed, and we hope policymakers will be open to the reforms that may be 
needed to maximize the potential for increases in consumer welfare. 
